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THE INDIAN TRUST RESPONSIBILITY:
PROTECTING TRIBAL LANDS AND RESOURCES




Enforcement of the federal trust responsibility' is necessary to protect
Native America from environmental assault. Traditional lifeways that reach back
literally thousands of years are poised in jeopardy along with the natural resources
upon which they depend. Across Indian country, many tribes are at the brink of
losing their fish and wildlife resources, having their land and water supplies
contaminated, or having their sacred sites destroyed forever. At least 317
reservations in the United States are "threatened by environmental hazards.,
2
For example, the Confederated Colville Tribes of Washington, the Chippewas of
Wisconsin, the Gros Ventre and Assiniboine Tribes of Montana, and several
others battle massive mining projects just off reservation boundaries.3 The
Northern Cheyenne Tribe deals with impacts from five coal strip mines, a 2,000-
megawatt power plant, and potentially 16,000 new coal methane wells off its
reservation. The Pyramid Lake Band of Paiutes and the Klamath, Yakama,
Spokane, Salish, and Kootenai Tribes struggle to reclaim enough water in the
* Professor and Director, Environmental and Natural Resources Law Program, University of
Oregon School of Law. This essay is based on remarks made to the Federal Bar Association, 28th
Annual Indian Law Conference, April 10, 2003, Albuquerque, New Mexico. Footnotes have been
added for reference to authorities and materials.
1. For an in-depth examination of the federal trust responsibility, see Mary Christina Wood,
Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 Utah L. Rev.
1471 [hereinafter Wood, Trust I]; Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty:
A New Trust Paradigm for Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 Utah L. Rev.
109 [hereinafter Wood, Trust II]; Mary Christina Wood, Fulfilling the Executive's Trust Responsibility
Toward the Native Nations on Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the Clinton Administration's
Promises and Performance, 25 Envtl. L. 733 (1995) [hereinafter Wood, Trust III].
2. Winona LaDuke, All Our Relations: Native Struggles for Land and Life 2 (S. End Press 1999).
3. See Wisc. v. EPA, 266 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2001); Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236
F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 2000); Island Mt. Protectors, 144 IBLA 168 (1998).
4. Bob Struckman & Ray Ring, A Breath of Fresh Air, 35 High Country News 1, 1, 8 (Jan. 20,
2003) (available at <http://www.hcn.org/servlets/hcn.Article?article id=13658>).
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rivers to sustain their fisheries.' The Western Shoshones in Nevada confront a
proposed nuclear waste dump, as well as. the existing fallout from nuclear waste
testing on their aboriginal lands.6 The fishing tribes of the Columbia River Basin
urge changes in hydrosystem operations to prevent the salmon species they have
relied on for nearly 10,000 years from becoming extinct.7 The Hopi, Navajo,
Sioux, Pueblo, Paiute, Quechan, Blackfeet, Wintu, Zuni, and perhaps dozens of
other tribes now fight to protect their sacred sites from desecration. 8 These
threats to Indian country are pervasive, and the potential damage is permanent.
In the treaty era, the government promised homelands that could sustain
tribal lifeways, governments, and economies. But much of the natural web that
supports tribal life and culture occurs beyond the boundaries of Indian country.
These lands contain species that tribes hunt and fish for, roots and berries that
they gather, headwaters and tributaries that flow into their reservation streams,
and sacred sites. These are being destroyed at an unprecedented pace, and the
pressure from industrial America is both unyielding and unbounded, coming from
corporations that feed on growth. While environmental disease may sooner or
later affect everyone in the United States, the impacts on Indian country are
magnified, because the land base is the linchpin for tribal survival. The trust
responsibility should play a role in protecting tribal lands and resources, but the
trust doctrine stands in potential jeopardy today as courts collapse protective trust
requirements into statutory standards.
II.
Jerry Meninick, a member of the Yakama Nation, once said in testimony
before Congress: "My ancestor.., who signed the treaty.., accepted the word of
the United States-that this treaty would protect not only the Indian way of life
for those then living, but also for all generations yet unborn." 9 His words capture
a fundamental premise-the duty of protection-that forms the background of
every relinquishment of native property, whether accomplished by treaty, statute,
5. See Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 499 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Michael C. Blumm & Brett M. Swift, The Indian
Treaty Piscary Profit and Habitat Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69
U. Colo. L. Rev. 407,470-78 (1998).
6. See Wood, Trust I, supra n. 1, at 1489, 1489-90 n. 85; Las Vegas Sun, Inc., Western Shoshone
Protest Yucca Mountain Project <http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/text/20O2/may/ll/
051110478.html> (May 11, 2002).
7. See Mary Christina Wood, The Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital (Part I): Applying
Principles of Sovereignty to Protect Imperiled Wildlife Populations, 37 Idaho L. Rev. 1, 1-3 (2000)
[hereinafter Wood, Wildlife Capital Part f]; Mary Christina Wood, Reclaiming the Natural Rivers: The
Endangered Species Act as Applied to Endangered River Ecosystems, 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 197, 227-28
(1998) [hereinafter Wood, Reclaiming Natural Rivers] (describing tribal salmon recovery plan).
8. See Faith Rogow & Christopher McLeod, In the Light of Reverence: Teacher's Guide 6-8
(Sacred Land Film Project 2002); Sandra B. Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of Hope: Cultural
Resources on Public Lands, 73 U. Colo. L. Rev. 413, 459-61, 466, 474 (2002); Suzan Shown Harjo,
Indian Country Today, Perspectives, Harjo: Prayers to Protect Salt Mother and Sacred Places <http://
www.indiancountry.com/?1060357108> (Aug. 8, 2003).
9. Wood, Trust III, supra n. 1, at 769 (internal quotations omitted).
[Vol. 39:355
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or executive order.'0 In exchange for receiving Indian lands, the government
would protect tribes on their retained lands, or reservations, and in some cases
would extend protection to traditional uses on off-reservation lands. For example,
in 1854-1855, when the federal government negotiated treaties with the fishing
tribes of the Pacific Northwest,1' the tribes agreed to cede the majority of their
lands only in exchange for assurances that their fishing rights in these areas would
be protected. - The government promised this, and on this promise, the tribes of
the Pacific Northwest ceded 64 million acres of land to the federal government. 3
Across the country, native reliance on such federal promises of protection was
manifest and gave rise to a sovereign trust for the benefit of all tribes. 4 The
question is whether these federal promises endure to meaningfully protect tribal
resources today.
Certainly the promise of protection is tested by modem industrial society. In
the Columbia River Basin, for example, just after treaties were signed, an
unprecedented -human assault began on the natural resources that supported life
throughout the basin. Non-Indians commercially over-fished the salmon."
10. See Parravano v. Babbitt, 70 F.3d 539, 545 (9th Cir. 1995) ("We have long held that when it
comes to protecting tribal rights against non-federal interests, it makes no difference whether those
rights derive from treaty, statute or executive order, unless Congress has provided otherwise.").
11. See Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 904 (D. Or. 1969) (construing such treaties); Blumm &
Swift, supra n. 5, at 426 n. 91 (listing treaties).
12. See Wash. v. Wash. St. Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel Assn., 443 U.S. 658, 667-68 (1979) ("At
the treaty council the United States negotiators promised, and the Indians understood, that the
Yakimas would forever be able to continue the same off-reservation food gathering and fishing practices
as to time, place, method, species and extent as they had or were exercising. The Yakimas relied on these
promises and they formed a material and basic part of the treaty and of the Indians' understanding of
the meaning of the treaty." (quoting U.S. v. Wash., 384 F. Supp. 312, 381 (W.D. Wash. 1974))
(emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted)). The following clause in the Treaty of Medicine
Creek is identical, or nearly identical, to the language used in the other Northwest treaties:
The right of taking fish, at all usual and accustomed grounds and stations, is further
secured to said Indians, in common with all citizens of the Territory, and of erecting
temporary houses for the purpose of curing, together with the privilege of hunting, gathering
roots and berries, and pasturing their horses on open and unclaimed lands ....
Treaty with Nisquallys (Dec. 26, 1854), 10 Stat. 1132, 1133; see Wash. St. Com. Passenger Fishing Vessel
Assn., 443 U.S. at 674 (quoting the treaty and observing similarity among Northwest treaties).
13. See Blumm & Swift, supra n. 5, at 426.
14. See Dept. of Int. & Bureau of Indian Affairs v. Klamath Water Users Protective Assn., 532 U.S. 1,
11 (2001) ("The fiduciary relationship has been described as 'one of the primary cornerstones of Indian
law,' and has been compared to one existing under a common law trust, with the United States as
trustee, the Indian tribes or individuals as beneficiaries, and the property and natural resources
managed by the United States as the trust corpus." (quoting Felix S. Cohen's Handbook of Federal
Indian Law 221 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., Michie Bobbs-Merrill 1982)) (citation omitted));
Parravano, 70 F.3d at 547 ("[T]he Tribes' federally reserved fishing rights are accompanied by a
corresponding duty on the part of the government to preserve those rights."); Morton, 354 F. Supp. at
257; N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 12 Indian L. Rptr. 3065, 3066 (D. Mont. 1985); Klamath Tribes v.
U.S., 1996 WL 924509 at **7-8 (D. Or. Oct. 2, 1996); N.W. Sea Farms, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engrs., 931 F. Supp. 1515, 1520 (W.D. Wash. 1996) ("It is this fiduciary duty, rather than any express
regulatory provision, which mandates that the Corps take treaty rights into consideration."); Island Mt.
Protectors, 144 IBLA at 185 (noting that, apart from statutory laws that may impose trust duties, the
Department's "original trust responsibility [requires the agency] ... to consult with the Tribes and to
identify, protect, and conserve trust resources, trust assets, and Tribal health and safety in making
its ... decisions").
15. See Charles F. Wilkinson, Crossing the Next Meridian: Land, Water, and the Future of the West
187-89 (Island Press 1992).
2003]
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Industry came and, with federal approval and subsidies, ravaged the region-
building dams, destroying wetlands, polluting waters, clear-cutting forests,
building cities, constructing nuclear and defense facilities, and killing entire
stretches of river through mining waste.16 By 1995, the National Marine Fisheries
Service concluded that "[flew examples of naturally functioning aquatic systems
(watersheds) now remain in the Pacific Northwest."' 7 The Columbia River Basin
salmon runs, once the largest in the world, declined over ninety percent from
historical levels.18 In a short century and a half, fifty-nine stocks of salmon became
extinct in the basin, and another fifty are at high or moderate risk of extinction.19
This same pattern of ecological devastation impacts tribes across the country.
For the trust obligation to have any force in the contemporary setting, it
must be viewed as a property law concept. It is a principle that arises from the
native relinquishment of land in reliance on federal assurances that retained lands
and resources would be protected for future generations. t° It bears rough analogy
to nuisance and trespass law.2' Ownership of land carries corollary rights of
government protection-the right to seek judicial redress against harm to
property. The Indian trust responsibility is protection for property guaranteed on
the sovereign level, from the federal government to tribes.
Unfortunately, the trust responsibility has not been clearly characterized as a
federal doctrine of property law. Judges, attorneys, and scholars often describe
the trust duty of protection as a principle deriving from a guardian-ward
relationship between the federal government and tribes. This paternalistic
characterization has its origin in an analogy made by Chief Justice Marshall in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,22 where he commented that the tribes were "domestic
dependent nations, 23 whose "relation to the United States resembles that of a
ward to his guardian. 2 4 A sovereign trust duty of protection should not at all
16. Id. at 192-93; Wood, Trust I, supra n. 1, at 1491-94.
17. Natl. Marine Fisheries Serv., Proposed Recovery Plan for Snake River Salmon V-1-2 (U.S. Dept.
Com. 1995) (citation omitted).
18. See Wood, Trust III, supra n. 1, at 763 n. 145.
19. See id. at 764.
20. See Report on Trust Responsibilities and the Federal Indian Relationship, Final Report to the
American Indian Policy Review Commission 51 (1976) (noting trust obligation was a "significant part
of the consideration" for the native cessions of land to the United States (quoting Memo. from Reid P.
Chambers, Assoc. Sol. for Indian Affairs, U.S. Dept. Int., to Int. Sol. & Sec. of Int., Attributes and
Legal Obligations Encompassed within Secretary of Interior's Trust Responsibilities to American
Indians (Jan. 18, 1974)) (internal quotations omitted)).
21. See Or. Denying Defs.' Mot. Dismiss at 6-7, Gros Ventre Tribe v. U.S., CV 00-69-M-DWM (D.
Mont. issued Jan. 29, 2001) (copy on file with Tulsa Law Review). In reviewing a claim by tribes
alleging that the Bureau of Land Management violated its trust obligation toward the tribes in allowing
mining operations near tribal lands, the Gros Ventre court found the case "more analogous to one
brought by a homeowner for relief from unauthorized encroachments on her property as a result of an
agency's actions than.., to one brought by a third party with standing to challenge an administrative
decision." Id.
22. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
23. Id. at 17.
24. Id.; see U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886) ("These Indian tribes are the wards of the
nation.... From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the
Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of
protection, and with it the power.").
[Vol. 39:355
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depend on a guardian-ward relationship. The public trust doctrine in
environmental law involves a sovereign trust model, but with no guardian-ward
aspect.25  Chief Justice Marshall recognized the autonomy of tribes within a
sovereign trust framework in Worcester v. Georgia,26 when he commented: "This
relation [between the Cherokee Nation and the United States] was that of a
nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more powerful: not that of
individuals abandoning their national character, and submitting as subjects to the
laws of a master., 27 This language in Worcester, rather than the guardian-ward
description in Cherokee Nation, provides an appropriate wellspring for the
common law trust duty towards tribes.
It is difficult to ignore the fact that many courts today still mention the
guardian-ward relationship as the source of the federal Indian trust
responsibility. 28 But these courts generally parrot language from earlier opinions.
Such rhetoric is likely to continue as long as tribal lawyers link the trust
responsibility to the guardian-ward relationship. Those who believe that the trust
doctrine can be useful today in protecting tribal rights could begin purging the
trust responsibility of paternalistic guardian-ward language. Tribal lawyers can
assert the trust duty in clear and forceful terms by referring to the "sovereign
trusteeship" rather than the guardian-ward relationship to describe the basis of
that protection owed tribes on a sovereign level.
2 9
III.
The context for enforcing the essential trust promise of protection has
changed much in the last 150-200 years since treaty times. Bringing meaning to
the trust responsibility in the modern setting involves an understanding of the
actions presenting ecological threats to tribes and the legal structure in which
those actions are otherwise sanctioned. In the early periods, federal protection
was needed to secure reservation lands against the intrusions of white settlers.
25. The public trust doctrine and the Indian trust doctrine are in the same "genre" of implied
sovereign property rights. See Mary Christina Wood, The Tribal Property Right to Wildlife Capital
(Part It): Asserting a Sovereign Servitude to Protect Habitat of Imperiled Species, 25 Vt. L. Rev. 355,
392-93 (2001). The public trust doctrine arose from an early case, Illinois Central Railroad Co. v.
Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892), in which the Supreme Court found by implication a "trust" on submersible
lands that were of critical value to the public. See id. at 393-94. The "trust" amounted to a retained
property right, held by the public, in lands that were later transferred to a private party. See Harrison
C. Dunning, The Public Trust: A Fundamental Doctrine of American Property Law, 19 Envtl. L. 515,
516-17 (1989) (noting that public trust doctrine recognizes public property rights in the form of
easements that burden private ownership of particular resources). Though unique in its formulation,
the Indian trust doctrine bears analogy to the public trust doctrine as a property law concept. It can be
thought of as a broadly implied servitude over lands conveyed by tribes to maintain natural
characteristics essential to paramount tribal interests. See Wood, supra n. 25, at 391-97.
26. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
27. Id. at 555 (emphases added).
28. See U.S. v. White Mt. Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 474 n. 3 (2003) (recognizing the general trust
relationship between tribes and the United States as one of "a ward to his guardian" (quoting
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17) (internal quotations omitted)).
29. See Wood, Trust I, supra n. 1, at 1498 (describing the "sovereign trusteeship" as "embod[ying] a
strong presumption of native sovereignty.., premised on a model of federal-tribal relations organized
around a paradigm of native separatism").
2003]
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Today, federal protection is needed to shield Indian country from environmental
threats coming primarily from corporate industry and the government itself.
Federal agencies have a tremendous impact on Indian country through their land
management and regulatory implementation of federal environmental laws, under
which they permit a variety of private activities that degrade the environment.
Unlike historical times, there is now a detailed statutory environmental
scheme to control actions that harm the environment-a scheme that includes the
Clean Water Act,3° the Clean Air Act,31 the Safe Drinking Water Act,32 the
Endangered Species Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and more.
This federal statutory structure obscures the role of the trust doctrine in protecting
native lands and resources, because there is a tendency to assume that the
multitude of environmental laws will protect Indian country. There is a basic
problem with this assumption. These statutes, and the regulations implementing
them, were promulgated to meet the interests of the majority, not tribes. The
Clean Water Act, for example, allows discharges of pollutants that may be
acceptable to the majority population, but not acceptable for water quality that
supports tribal drinking water, fishing, or cultural use. The land management
statutes governing Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management activities
routinely allow destruction of federal land where sacred sites are located.35
Environmental statutes generally do not protect uniquely tribal resources.
Carrying out the Indian trust duty of protection in the contemporary setting
requires prioritizing the trust responsibility in the missions of agencies acting
under statutory law. Court decisions make clear that the entire federal
government is blanketed by the trust responsibility, and that every federal agency,
not just the Bureau of Indian Affairs, must fulfill the trust responsibility in
implementing statutes.36 While agency officials have no authority to deviate from
explicit statutory mandates, all environmental statutes give broad discretion to the
agencies. Most agencies could establish higher levels of protection, but choose not
to because the interests of the majority do not demand it. The challenge for tribal
lawyers is to analyze these statutes, find the pockets of discretion that they
contain, and define the duty of protection that is required to safeguard tribal
property interests.
Professor Catherine O'Neill wrote a thorough article in which she
demonstrated how an agency should carry out the trust duty of protection within a
30. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977).
31. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
32. Pub. L. No. 93-523, 88 Stat. 1660 (1974).
33. Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973).
34. Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
35. See generally Zellmer, supra n. 8.
36. See Parravano, 70 F.3d at 546 ("This trust responsibility extends not just to the Interior
Department, but attaches to the federal government as a whole."); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of
Indians v. U.S. Dept. of Navy, 898 F.2d 1410, 1420 (9th Cir. 1990); Nance v. EPA, 645 F.2d 701, 711 (9th
Cir. 1981); N.W. Sea Farms, 931 F. Supp. at 1519 ("This [trust] obligation has been interpreted to
impose a fiduciary duty owed in conducting 'any Federal government action' which relates to Indian
Tribes." (quoting Nance, 645 F.2d at 711)).
[Vol. 39:355
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complex statutory scheme.37 She addressed the standards set by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency under the Clean Water Act for discharges of
dioxin and other pollutants and found that these standards failed to protect tribal
interests, in part because they still allowed for considerable bioaccumulation of
toxins in fish tissue.38 She pointed out that, because tribal consumption of fish is
much higher than that of the average American, standards that might be
protective of the majority's interests were not protective of Indian interests.39 She
identified the agency's discretion to change the standards and argued that the trust
responsibility required such a change.40  This work has been instrumental and
serves as an example of how to bring meaning to the trust responsibility within a
detailed statutory structure. Indeed, many agencies have embarked on a process
to define their trust obligation within the context of their governing statutes. A
leading example is the joint issuance of a Secretarial Order on fulfilling trust
responsibilities in Endangered Species Act implementation by the Departments of
Commerce and Interior, an effort that involved many tribes.
41
IV.
The potency of the trust responsibility in protecting native lands and
resources depends ultimately on its reception in the courts. In that setting, the
federal trust responsibility takes the form of a common law duty to protect tribal
property and resources. There is strength in that form of law, as compared to
statutory law. As the Supreme Court of Oregon put it long ago: "The very
essence of the common law is flexibility and adaptability. It does not consist of
fixed rules, but is the best product of human reason applied to the premises of the
ordinary and extraordinary conditions of life ... ,,42
The common law is a powerful and unique tool in the protection of Indian
property, because it allows judges to formulate legal principles to carry out the
intent of the treaties or other agreements. It was under the authority of common
law that the Supreme Court upheld a share of up to fifty percent of the
harvestable fish for the treaty tribes in Washington v. Washington Passenger
Fishing Vessel Association,43 and found an implied water right associated with
reservation lands in Winters v. United States.44 When tribal attorneys seek to
37. Catherine A. O'Neill, Variable Justice: Environmental Standards, Contaminated Fish, and
"Acceptable" Risk to Native Peoples, 19 Stan. Envtl. L.J. 3 (2000).
38. Id. at 7-8, 16-18.
39. Id. at 36-54. Professor O'Neill also pointed to cultural effects on tribes associated with
contaminated fish. Id. at 14-16.
40. Id. at 54-69, 105.
41. American Indian Tribal Rights, Federal-Tribal Trust Responsibilities, and the Endangered
Species Act, Jt. Secretarial Or., No. 3206 (Dept. Int. & Dept. Com. June 5, 1997) (available at <http://
elips.doi.gov/elips/sec-orders/html orders/3206.htm>); see Charles Wilkinson, The Role of Bilateralism
in Fulfilling the Federal-Tribal Relationship: The Tribal Rights-Endangered Species Secretarial Order,
72 Wash. L. Rev. 1063 (1997) (reprinting Order and discussing process leading to issuance of Order).
42. In re Hood River, 227 P. 1065, 1086 (Or. 1924).
43. 443 U.S. at 685-89.
44. 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
2003]
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protect Indian resources by bringing statutory claims, they put the court in an
entirely different position. In that situation, the court is not creating common law,
but rather, is interpreting the will of Congress, a will most often geared to majority
interests.
When the trust doctrine is used to protect Indian property from federal
agency action, it is nearly always cast as a claim under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).45 The APA allows anyone to sue an agency for action that
is arbitrary, capricious, "or otherwise not in accordance with law," 46 including the
common law. APA claimants generally seek injunctive relief in federal district
court, challenging agency action that is carried out within a statutory regime.
Accordingly, the tribal lawyer must argue that the agency is bound by the trust
responsibility to use its discretion within that statutory regime to protect tribal
interests unless doing so conflicts with the actual statutory language.47 The
successful cases for tribes are those in which the judge clearly identifies the
discretion in the statute, understands the Indian interest, and recognizes that the
Indian interest demands protection greater than that normally provided by the
agency.
In a 1996 case, for example, the Klamath Tribe was successful in halting
timber sales planned by the U.S. Forest Service on forest lands that supported
treaty deer herds.48 In that case, the district court of Oregon ruled that the
government had a "substantive duty to protect 'to the fullest extent possible' the
Tribes' treaty rights, and the resources on which those rights depend., 49 In
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe v. Morton, the court held that the Secretary of Interior
had to send all water in the Truckee River not otherwise obligated by contract or
decree, to Pyramid Lake to support a tribal fishery.50 In Northern Cheyenne Tribe
v. Hodel, the district court rejected the Bureau of Land Management's proposal to
lease federal lands for coal development just outside the Northern Cheyenne
reservation because coal mining would have adverse environmental, social, and
economic effects on the tribe." The court stated: "[A] federal agency's trust
obligation to a tribe extends to actions it takes off a reservation which uniquely
impact tribal members or property on a reservation.",12 The court held firm
despite the federal government's contention that the national interest in
developing coal overshadowed the trust duty towards the tribe, stating:
The Secretary's conflicting responsibilities.., do not relieve him of his trust
obligations. To the contrary, identifying and fulfilling the trust responsibility is even
45. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2000).
46. Id. § 706(2)(a).
47. See N.W. Sea Farms, 931 F. Supp. at 1519-20 (noting that the general trust obligation constitutes
"'law to apply' consistent with Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714
(1985)").
48. Klamath Tribes, 1996 WL 924509 at **7-10.
49. Id. at *8 (quoting Morton, 354 F. Supp. at 256).
50. 354 F. Supp. at 256.
51. 12 Indian L. Rptr. at 3071, 3074.
52. Id. at 3071.
[Vol. 39:355
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more important in situations such as the present case where an agency's conflicting
goals and responsibilities combined with political pressure asserted by non-Indians
can lead federal agencies to compromise or ignore Indian rights.
53
In two more recent cases, the agencies themselves have set a greater
standard to protect Indian interests in fulfillment of their trust responsibility, and
the courts have upheld the higher standard under authority of the trust doctrine.
In Northwest Sea Farms v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the federal district court
upheld the Corps' refusal of a permit for a fish farm because such an activity could
interfere with the treaty fisheries of the Lummi Nation and Nooksack Tribes.
5 4
The Corps of Engineers found its pocket of discretion in Section 10 of the Rivers
and Harbors Act;55 the Corps could deny a permit that conflicted with the public
interest, and it construed "public interest" to include the protection of treaty
56rights. The district court solidly supported this interpretation, holding that the
fiduciary trust duty formed a legal mandate within the statute.5 ' And in Parravano
v. Babbitt, a case decided in 1995, the Ninth Circuit upheld an emergency
regulation issued by the Department of Commerce to curtail non-Indian fishing
under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (Magnuson
Act)58 in order to protect the salmon runs for the Hoopa Valley and Yurok
Tribes.5 9 The court found that the government's trust duty of protection toward
tribal fisheries amounted to "any other applicable law" which the Secretary of
Commerce must take into consideration when establishing fishery standards under
60the terms of the Magnuson Act.
V.
The clash of different sets of environmental standards, one tailored to the
majority society, and the other necessary to sustain native lifeways, will produce
many complex issues in the application of trust duties to the natural resources
context. Unfortunately, development of the trust doctrine to protect uniquely
tribal interests has been stymied due to several cases that equate tribal interests
with statutory standards. These opinions conclude that if the agency abides by the
statute, it is protecting the Indian interest as well. The courts in these cases
essentially collapse trust standards into statutory standards. This is a dangerous
trend. When judges equate trust standards with statutory standards, they
eliminate the role of the trust responsibility in protecting uniquely tribal interests,
and Indian law itself moves towards assimilation because the one potentially
powerful tool for protecting unique native interests becomes interpreted as merely
53. Id. (citation omitted).
54. 931 F. Supp. at 1521-22.
55. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2000).
56. N. W. Sea Farms, 931 F. Supp. at 1518.
57. Id. at 1520.
58. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (1976).
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a majority standard. And more broadly, when courts define common law duties
according to statutory standards, they diminish their own role in protecting native
rights, and the balance of power shifts towards Congress. It is vital to keep the
common law alive as a reservoir of native rights.
A muddled line of cases interpreting the trust doctrine in the context of
APA claims has established precedent that, unless cleared up soon, may
extinguish any effective use of the trust doctrine in preventing agencies from
harming tribal property interests. This line of cases builds from a basic confusion
between the two contexts in which the trust, responsibility is enforced against
agencies. One context involves tribes seeking injunctive relief under the APA in
federal district court.61 This is an important context because injunctive relief seeks
to stop damage before it happens. The second context involves tribes seeking
monetary damages against the BIA for mismanaging their lands. Those suits are
brought in the Court of Federal Claims under the Tucker Act62 or the Indian
Tucker Act.63 All four of the major Supreme Court cases dealing with the federal
trust obligation arose out of this damages context, causing it to receive far more
attention than the equally important context of injunctive relief.64
The Tucker Act statutes and the APA have very different requirements for
establishing claims. Both of the Tucker Acts require express law supporting
claims for damages against the United States.65 The Indian Tucker Act requires
that claims be based on express law found in the Constitution, statutes, executive
orders, or treaties.66 The Tucker Act requires that claims be based on the
Constitution or a statute, regulation, or contract.67 The Supreme Court has
stressed that the express source of law supporting either Tucker Act claim must
"fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for
61. For a discussion of cases brought in this context, see text accompanying supra notes 47-60.
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000).
63. Id. § 1505.
64. White Mt. Apache, 537 U.S. 465; U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488 (2003); U.S. v. Mitchell, 463
U.S. 206 (1983) ("Mitchell Ir'); U.S. v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980) ("Mitchell ").
65. The Tucker Act allows individuals to pursue monetary claims against the federal government.
The Act extends to claims by allottees on Indian reservations. The Indian Tucker Act allows tribes to
sue the federal government for damages. See Mitchell H, 463 U.S. at 211-12.
66. The Indian Tucker Act provides:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction of any claim against the
United States accruing after August 13, 1946, in favor of any tribe, band, or other
identifiable group of American Indians residing within the territorial limits of the United
States or Alaska whenever such claim is one arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of
the United States, or Executive orders of the President, or is one which otherwise would be
cognizable in the Court of Federal Claims if the claimant were not an Indian tribe, band or
group.
28 U.S.C. § 1505 (emphases added).
67. The Tucker Act provides in pertinent part:
The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon
any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of
Congress or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or implied
contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort.
Id. § 1491(a)(1) (emphases added).
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the damage sustained., 68 Trust enforcement under the APA is much broader than
under the Tucker Acts, because there is no requirement of premising a claim on a
statute or some other source of express law.69  Due to the critical differences
between the Tucker Acts and the APA, courts should treat trust cases arising
under these statutes separately, so as to develop two distinct prongs of the overall
trust doctrine.
The Pyramid Lake, Northern Cheyenne, Northwest Sea Farms, Klamath, and
Parravano cases form one clear prong of the trust doctrine and accept broad
common law assertions of the trust responsibility within the context of claims for
injunctive relief under the APA.7 ° Cases arising under the Tucker Acts form the
other prong.7 But recent decisions have ignored the different contexts in which
trust claims are brought, applying Tucker Act restrictions to claims brought under
the APA. These holdings require a statute or other source of express law to
support a trust claim brought under the APA. The approach is erroneous,
because the APA does not have the restrictive language found in the Tucker Acts.
The judicial error confusing the two prongs of trust enforcement traces back
through the caselaw to a 1980 case decided by the District of Columbia Circuit,
North Slope Borough v. Andrus.72 In that case, the Inupiat people of Alaska sued
the Secretary of Interior, arguing that federal oil leasing in the Beaufort Sea would
threaten the bowhead whale population that they hunted, and therefore would
violate the Secretary's trust responsibility.73 This was a suit seeking injunctive
relief.74 In unfortunate language that launched the present confusion, the court
applied Mitchell I (a Tucker Act case) and held:
"A trust responsibility can only arise from a statute, treaty, or executive order"; in
this respect we are governed by the recent Supreme Court decision in United States
v. Mitchell holding that the United States bore no fiduciary responsibility to Native
Americans under a statute which contained no specific provision in the terms of the
statute.
68. Mitchell 11, 463 U.S. at 216-17 (quoting U.S. v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400 (1976)) (internal
quotations omitted). The Supreme Court has also indicated that the federal government's "elaborate
control" over tribal property may support a claim under both Tucker Acts. See White Mt. Apache, 537
U.S. at 474; Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 209, 225. This control theory, however, is generally not applicable
where the government is taking action off the reservation, thereby incidentally affecting, rather than
directly controlling, tribal property.
69. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (granting general authority to courts to set aside agency action "not in
accordance with law"); text accompanying supra n. 46.
70. Parravano, 70 F.3d at 547; Morton, 354 F. Supp. at 257; N. Cheyenne Tribe, 12 Indian L. Rptr. at
3066; Klamath Tribes, 1996 WL 924509 at **7-8; N.W. Sea Farms, 931 F. Supp. at 1520 ("It is this
fiduciary duty, rather than any express regulatory provision, which mandates that the Corps take treaty
rights into consideration."); see Island Mt. Protectors, 144 IBLA at 185 (noting that, apart from
statutory laws that may impose trust duties, the Department's "original trust responsibility [requires
the agency] ... to consult with the Tribes and to identify, protect, and conserve trust resources, trust
assets, and Tribal health and safety in making its... decisions").
71. See White Mt. Apache, 537 U.S. 465; Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488; Mitchell I1, 463 U.S. 206;
Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. 535.
72. 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
73. Id. at 592-93.
74. Id. at 592.
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We have no specific provision for a federal trust responsibility in any of the
statutes argued to us.... By confining the extension of "trust responsibility,"
however defined and whatever the source, to the area of overlap with the
environmental statutes, the district court was arguably consistent with the Supreme
Court's rationale in United States v. Mitchell. Without an unambiguous provision by
Congress that clearly outlines a federal trust responsibility, courts must appreciate
that whatever fiduciary obligation otherwise exists, it is a limited one only.
75
This judicial misstep is rather astonishing because it amounts to applying the
strict requirements of one statute (the Tucker Act) to a case premised on an
entirely different statute (the APA) lacking such restrictive language.76  The
Mitchell I holding (upon which the North Slope court relied) was tied to the
express language in the Tucker Act.77
Unfortunately, once a mistake takes hold in one case, it becomes stare
decisis that judges rely upon in deciding future cases, and can thereby metastasize
through an entire body of caselaw. The misapplication of the trust doctrine
originating in North Slope has now found its way into Ninth Circuit law, blurring
the critical distinction between the two prongs of trust enforcement. In a 1998
case, the Morongo Band of Mission Indians brought a claim under the APA
against the Federal Aviation Administration for situating a flight path into the Los
Angeles airport directly over canyons on the reservation where tribal members
conducted traditional ceremonies.78 The court applied Mitchell H (a case arising
75. Id. at 611-12 (quoting N. Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332, 344 (D.D.C. 1980))
(alteration and footnotes omitted).
76. For further discussion, see Wood, Trust II, supra n. 1, at 117-21.
77. Mitchell 1, 445 U.S. at 538, 546. In Mitchell I, the Court emphasized:
The individual claimants in this action premised jurisdiction in the Court of Claims upon
the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491, which gives that court jurisdiction of "any claim against
the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress."
The General Allotment Act ... cannot be read as establishing that the United States has a
fiduciary responsibility for management of allotted forest lands. Any right of the
respondents to recover money damages for Government mismanagement of timber
resources must be found in some source other than that Act.
445 U.S. at 538, 546. In Mitchell II, the Court stated:
[I]n United States v. Mitchell [1].... this Court concluded that the General Allotment Act
does not confer a right to recover money damages against the United States.... [W]e held
that the Act creates only a limited trust relationship. The trust language of the Act does not
impose any fiduciary management duties or render the United States answerable for breach
thereof....
Thus, for claims against the United States "founded either upon the Constitution, or any
Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department," a court must inquire
whether the source of substantive law can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation
by the Federal Government for the damages sustained.
The question in this case is... whether the statutes or regulations at issue can be interpreted
as requiring compensation.
463 U.S. at 217-18 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491) (citations omitted).
78. Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. FAA, 161 F.3d 569, 572 (9th Cir. 1998).
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under the Tucker Act) and concluded: "[U]nless there is a specific duty that has
been placed on the government with respect to Indians, [the trust] responsibility is
discharged by the agency's compliance with general regulations and statutes not
specifically aimed at protecting Indian tribes."79 Other decisions also appear to
take this approach.80 Moreover, the Department of Justice is now perpetuating
this mistake in defending the government in an APA suit over a mine that
threatens tribal resources. 8' The prerequisite of finding a specific statutory trust
duty presents a barrier to effective litigation brought by tribes seeking to protect
their lands and resources. With the exception of some historic preservation laws,
environmental or natural resources statutes do not impose specific duties towards
tribes.
It is vital to clear up the confused direction of the trust doctrine in order to
eliminate the ill-founded barrier tribes now face when enforcing the general trust
responsibility through claims for injunctive relief. It is important to develop the
doctrine along two prongs reflecting the very different requirements of the
79. Id. at 574; see Skokomish Indian Tribe v. FERC, 121 F.3d 1303, 1308-09 (9th Cir. 1997)
(rejecting arguments that FERC "must afford Indian tribes greater rights than they would otherwise
have under the [Federal Power Act] and its implementing regulations").
80. See Okanogan Highlands Alliance v. Williams, 236 F.3d 468, 479 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Federal
agencies owe a fiduciary responsibility to Native American tribes. In the absence of a specific duty,
this responsibility is discharged by 'the agency's compliance with general regulations and statutes not
specifically aimed at protecting Indian tribes."' (quoting Morongo Band, 161 F.3d at 574) (citations
omitted)); Or. Denying Defs.' Mot. Dismiss at 4, Gros Ventre Tribe v. U.S., CV 00-69-M-DWM (D.
Mont. issued Jan. 29, 2001) ("The United States' trust obligations are content-less unless a statute,
regulation, or treaty supplies the imperatives."). In Island Mountain Protectors, however, the court
noted:
In addition to a mandate found in a specific provision of a treaty, agreement, executive
order, or statute, any action by the Government is subject to a general trust
responsibility.... BLM had a trust responsibility to consider and protect Tribal resources.
"[A] federal agency's trust obligation to a tribe extends to actions it takes off a reservation
which uniquely impact tribal members or property on a reservation."
While the trust responsibility created by environmental laws may be "congruent" with other
duties they impose, the enactment of those laws does not diminish the Department's original
trust responsibility or cause it to disappear. BLM was required to consult with the Tribes
and to identify, protect, and conserve trust resources, trust assets, and Tribal health and
safety in making its [decision approving expansion of the mine].
144 IBLA at 184-85 (quoting N. Cheyenne, 12 Indian L. Rptr. at 3071) (citations omitted).
81. See Defs.' Mot. S.J. at 11-12, Gros Ventre Tribe v. U.S., CV 00-69-M-DWM (D. Mont. filed Dec.
11, 2002) (on file with Tulsa Law Review). There, the government argued:
Under [Mitchell I and Mitchell II], agencies have a general "trust relationship" with a
particular Indian Tribe, but not "any fiduciary management duties" or "a "[sic]fiduciary
relationship" with it, where a treaty or other federal law (1) establishes the general
objectives and standards of a trust and (2) does not specify how the trust's objectives will be
achieved by particularized methods or standards of care....
In the absence of a specific duty that has been placed on the government with respect to
the [tribes], the United States' general trust responsibility is discharged by compliance with
general regulations and statutes not specifically aimed at protecting Indian tribes. Thus, the
United States owes no fiduciary duty to the [tribes] apart from its obligations under the
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statutes underlying the two types of trust claims-claims for equitable relief under
the APA and claims for damages under the Tucker Act. The recent Navajo
Nation82 and White Mountain Apache83 cases provide. new Supreme Court
precedent that tribal attorneys can refer to in defining these distinct prongs in
order to turn the tide of precedent bdck to an enforceable trust obligation in the
APA context. Both cases arose under the Indian Tucker Act.84 While neither
case presents language distinguishing the Tucker Acts from the APA,"5 the Court
stated repeatedly and emphatically in both cases that the requirement of finding a
statutory basis for the trust (damages) claims derives directly from the language of
the Tucker Act or Indian Tucker Act.86 Tribal lawyers in trust cases now pending
before federal district courts should use the Supreme Court's pronouncements in
Navajo Nation and White Mountain Apache as an opportunity to distinguish
Tucker Act damages claims from APA claims for injunctive relief. Tribal lawyers
should clarify that claims brought under the APA may rely on a common law trust
duty interjected as an interstitial obligation within a statutory scheme lacking
explicit trust language.
VI.
The Indian trust doctrine is perhaps the only source of law that can protect
the natural landscapes, animals, and waters that sustain tribalism. This is a pivotal
point in the history of many tribes-a time that will determine whether ancient
lifeways associated with natural resources will survive into the future. Tribal
lawyers carrying the message of the sovereign trust to judges, agency officials, and
the public should have as their guiding compass the purest moral foundation of
the trust: the sacred promise, made to induce massive land cessions, that the
retained homelands would be protected to support tribal lifeways and generations
into the future. This fundamental promise of sovereign trust should be a focal
point for courts hearing claims for injunctive relief to protect tribal lands and
resources. Courts should invoke their equitable authority to restrain the majority
of society and its industry from bringing to ruin the natural systems sustaining
Native America.
82. 537 U.S. 488.
83. 537 U.S. 465.
84. See id. at 468; Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. at 502.
85. Such language would be dicta because the cases did not involve any claims for injunctive relief.
86. See White Mt. Apache, 537 U.S. at 472; Navajo Nation, 527 U.S. at 503-05, 514.
[Vol. 39:355
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 39 [2003], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol39/iss2/5
